KULTURKAMPF
The Global Matrix and the Predicament of
‘Postmodernisms’:
An Introduction to the Critique of Kulturkampf
Denise Ferreira da Silva∗
Let’s go ahead, set up our dichotomies and choose our colors.
Now read the text: what matters is what the options already prescribe,
the meaning of being before or after the “/,” the possible and
potential “truths” a particular position enables and/or precludes?
Explicitly or implicitly, the authors in this cluster address this
question when each shows how the recent articulation of the term
Kulturkampf rehearses the pair public/private, the founding liberal
distinction. When doing so, they delimit the challenge facing
progressive legal scholarship in a global (juridical, economic, and
ethical) configuration ruled by the conservative versions of the liberal
principles of diversity and multiculturalism. After each account of
neoconservative reactions to the social (racial, gendered/sexual,
economic) subaltern’s demands for (juridical and political)
representation, as I hope the reader will notice, it becomes evident
that any progressive rebuttal of the tale of “cultural wars” should
begin with the acknowledgement that the prevailing formulation of
the domain of the private deploys racial and cultural difference as
markers of those who fail to embrace the principle of universality.
When doing so they ask the reader to be aware of easy dichotomies
that recall the liberal ontology in which the principle of universality
and its signifiers produce the political scene as an abstract,
transcendent, configuration in which (racial, gender/sexual and
cultural) difference enters as a troubling rather than a constitutive
aspect of social life.
Through three moves these papers indicate the need for a
(re)formulation of the social which would not be immediately
resolved in the neoliberal-neoconservative reframing of the
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public/private dichotomy. First, to advance a conception of justice
(social justice), which seemingly contradicts law’s universality
principle, each addresses a signifier—race, religion, gender, and
sexuality—that refers to what I will call later the Global Matrix. By
doing so, they indicate how the writers of the tale “cultural wars”
deploy the principle of universality in an ethico-political battleground
in which these categories emerge as moral signifiers. Second, they
refuse neoconservative reconfigurations of cultural (identity) politics
that rewrite universality in a transparent domain of the public and
projects/demands for social justice onto a blurred domain of the
private. Third, none err by taking sides. Each cautions us that the
sides only come into being together—that the neoconservative
version of cultural difference already assumes that juridical
universality organizes the public domain. Put differently, when read
as a unit, these papers show that a viable critique of the tale of the
“cultural wars” should include the recognition that the terms—the
positions the hegemonic principles of diversity and multiculturalism
write—demarcate a political stance which ignores that the global now
constitutes the site of a productive struggle and a scene of ethical
embattlement created by the neoconservative reading of the
postmodern landscape. Not surprisingly, each author makes these
moves separately.
After all they engage a tradition—liberal
thought—which like all traditions never ceases to re-invent itself.
While naming this tradition will not resolve the predicament it
poses at the core of any critical legal project—but more particularity
to Critical Race Theory (CRT)—it does help us to understand why
progressive legal scholarship should engage neoconservative
articulations of the private in defenses of juridical universality.
Undoubtedly, the critical position these papers delineate, the one to
which LatCrit has been consistently moving towards, emerges in a
terrain which has been mapped by articulations of the principle of
universality, the one which distinguishes liberal (ontoepistemological) accounts. This terrain has been demarcated by a
notion of juridical universality—the founding thread that goes back
to Locke’s formulation of the idea of the rule of law itself. Through
the distinction between public and private, this troubling, yet
productive inheritance has manufactured the social subject
presupposed in what Michel Foucault terms the juridico-political
1
conception of power.
While immersed in ordered actual
relationships of exchange, as Peter Fitzpatrick reminds us, this social
(legal and political) subject has been always a global figure. For the
1
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“individual,” the “self-regulated subjectivity,” the autonomous figure
classic liberal theorizing describes emerging in Europe, “is a
condition for the existence of modern, liberal legality”, who shares in
law’s unique nature which is that it “is no longer tied to any
extraneous order, now deriving its force and origin purely from its
2
intrinsic being.”
For this reason, when interrupting the public/private dichotomy
with the question of the law’s (in)ability to ensure social justice, the
papers in this cluster necessarily displace juridical universality—that
of the law and of the social subject it institutes—when they recall the
limits of the social ontology that renders the possibility of collective
existence contingent upon the conception of the law as an
autonomous, exterior, controlling, force.
Nevertheless, the conception of (social) justice critical legal
theorizing (and other postmodern projects) advocates relies upon
the rendering of the principle of universality that produced the
subaltern subjects against which neoconservatives now unleash their
“moral wars,” the one which renders it possible to address the limits
of juridical universality. Here, I refer to the post-Enlightenment
projects of knowledge of society—anthropology, sociology,
psychoanalysis, etc.—which attempt to reconcile the abstract essence
which is actualized in the market, the state and legal apparatus, and
the actual differences that characterize modern collective existence,
ones which produce the modern (social) subject as a
spatial/temporal, a global-historical thing. That is, each shows how
in the tale of the “cultural wars,” the place of the proper social (legal
and moral) subject only encompasses a particular kind of human
beings, but ones whose (cultural) particularity only makes sense when
contrasted with other past and contemporary modes of being
3
human.
Because I cannot discuss the details of this second articulation of
universality, namely scientific universality, in the limited space of this
introduction, I move to show how, when exploring how a given social
scientific signifier—race, class, culture, gender/sexuality—is
reformulated in the neoliberal/neoconservative tale of “cultural
wars,” this cluster invites us to consider these categories as signifier of
the Global Matrix. In this invitation, I find the suggestion that we
have reached the limits of the 1980s politics of difference (or identity
politics or cultural politics), and that it has been absorbed into the
2
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‘original’ social model, which critical legal theorizing rejects, and
which is now re-articulated in the tale of “cultural wars.” Consistently,
this social ontology does not immediately allow for a mapping of the
Global
Matrix—the
ethical-juridical
configuration
which
encompasses the kind of human differentiation upon which critical
legal theorizing grounds its challenges to legal formalism and upon
which the writers of the tale of “cultural wars” rest their return to
their claim that the “individual,” or the “original” social
(legal/moral) thing is the sole subject of the private entitled to claim
juridical universality. Rejecting the privileged position, the public
domain which remains a monopoly of the “original” liberal subject—
European, while, male, property owner—each paper invites us to
revisit the axioms of liberalism informing the neoconservative
rendering of the Global Matrix.
What this cluster suggests is the need for another model, a
global-historical model, which assumes that the kind of difference
communicated by the categories of race, class, culture (religion,
language, etc.), and gender/sexuality, is not an individual (or
collective) substantive attribute. Instead, it indicates that these
consist in productive political strategies and are effects of social
scientific representations, which now govern the global (juridico,
economic, ethical) configuration. My point is that, when arguing for
the need to reconcile juridical universality and the recognition of
social differentiation, in a formulation of justice which addresses the
effects of juridical domination and economic exploitation, these
papers indicate that demands for social justice cannot presume (as in
the case of the Civil Rights movement) the nation-state as the sole
ethico-political paradigm. On the one hand, they indicate that to
undermine the productive effects of the signifiers of the Global
Matrix, and to redress the subjections they entail and justify, we need
an ethical principle which privileges representation both (a) in the
recognition that existing legal structures re-present a particular set of
principles of the “original” (autonomous) legal subject, (b) in the
production of a critical scholarship that re-presents, re-tells and resignifies the global-historical trajectory of subaltern social subjects,
and (c) that in order to understand this trajectory as an effect of the
social scientific signifiers which now organize our ‘postmodern’ social
(juridical, economic, and moral) configurations.
Each paper articulates a critique of the tale of Kulturkampf to
address (at least) one crucial question that should be raised by any
critical reading of, and political response to, the tale of the “cultural
wars.” (1) How do we reframe the subaltern legal perspective in such
a way to preempt the most destructive strategies deployed in the

2005

PREDICAMENT OF ‘POSTMODERNISMS’

1285

scene of theoretical embattlement? (2) How do we retain social
difference as the basis for demands for justice (juridical and political
representation) without re-producing subaltern subjects as
homogeneous and fixed cultural entities, i.e. as they have been
constructed in social scientific scholarship? (3) How do we reconcile
the various social scientific signifiers—class, gender/sexuality, race,
culture—in a critical project which does not repeat the pitfalls of
universality, i.e. the move that erases how western (colonial and
global) juridical, economic, and symbolic apparatuses produce
subaltern subjects in the various global regions? Finally, (4) how do
we engage in the struggle for subaltern representation while aware
that it will reinforce neoconservative agendas which recognize
difference but only to write a moral tale which renders its demands
for justice un-reconcilable with juridical universality? From a position
in between Derrick Bell’s racial realism and Kimberlé Crenshaw’s
4
strategic liberalism, they suggest that progressive legal theorizing
needs to map the Global Matrix—to identify its constitutive pairs and
to excavate and dissipate the “truth” they produce. As they trace the
effects of neoconservative appropriations of politics of
representation, each paper describes the obstacles and suggests
strategies for overcoming the founding public/private dichotomy
which informing legal scholarship and in the global ethico-political
grammar.
I.

THE RACE CRITIQUE: ITS OFFSPRING AND DISCONTENTS

In “Kulturkampf or ‘fits of spite’?: Taking the Academic Cultural
Wars Seriously,” Sylvia Lazos-Vargas addresses the question of what
should be the normative basis of the now fractured legal scholarship.
Instead of calling for an armistice, she welcomes the battle. She
reminds us that the contention is productive only if a common
ground for disagreement is identified, if destructive strategies are
avoided. That is, for Lazos-Vargas the academic “cultural wars” are
both necessary and productive in the present situation of American
legal scholarship. The problem, however, is that each of the
contending
parts
she
names—neo-traditionalists,
radicals,
assimilationists and latcriters—inhabits a moral position which, in its
turn, defines what is to be valued and that which is to be obliterated.
For this reason, instead of engaging each perspective as a position in
the larger moral field which could be called legal scholarship, the
4
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contenders choose to attack individuals and not their perspective—a
consistent liberal war tactic, to be sure.
When describing how this particular deployment of morality,
which addresses individuals and not their ideas, enters the academic
arena, she shows how the founding division public/private division
plays out in two fronts. In the neo-traditionalists- Critical Race
Theory (CRT) front, it tellingly actualizes the fundamental division –
rational/irrational – communicated by the signifier race, which here
takes the form of a distinction between objective/subjective,
change/permanence, or truth/prejudice, etc. On the one hand,
neo-traditionalists’ statements redeploy the rational/irrational pair
when accusing race crits of lack of intellectual rigor and
emotionalism to delineate the proper (moral) boundaries where
proper legal scholarship is produced. That is, she shows how here
the race signifier is not immediately, explicitly articulated but that it
organizes a distinction between “the professional” and its “others”
when neo-traditionalists accuse race crits of being badly trained legal
scholars. On the other hand, forced to play according to the rules
the “professional/non-professional” (rational/irrational) pair
institute, race crits cannot but charge that their foes deploy racial
stereotypes, that their reading of critical race scholarship lacks
“objectivity,” that it is resistant to change, based upon prejudice, etc.
In this scene of embattlement, both sides deploy race as a moral
signifier, which delimits the position that remains faithful to the
signifiers of (academic) universality—namely, objectivity, change,
truth, etc.
When contention takes place among racial subaltern legal
scholars, the battle becomes overly personalized while at the same
time the ethico-political stakes become more explicit. At stake here,
Lazos-Vargas argues, is a “minority perspective” as a point of
departure for theoretical critique.
Among scholars of color,
arguments regarding the appropriateness of a “minority” theoreticalmethodological perspective indicate a divide in terms of whether the
assimilationist (civil rights perspective), a radical, or a more complex
(LatCrit) critical position should prevail. While the line separating
the assimilationists from the others is easy to spot, the one separating
the radical and the complex one is not. According to Lazos-Vargas,
the divide here has to do with the reliance upon historicalmaterialism and its promises of a critical corner outside hegemonic
liberalism. If one recalls that historical materialism’s greatest
promise was nothing but the realization (by universalizing it) of
liberalism’s premise and promise that everyone is born and exists free
and equal, then the predicament which, according to radical “old-
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timers,” haunt lat-criters is nothing more than the promise of
liberation we all share. When Lazos-Vargas advocates a “healthy
dialogue,” however, she suggests that this embattlement can be
productive. Though she does not offer a path, her account of
“academic Kulturkampf” suggests at least a guiding question: Either
progressive legal (radicals and complex) scholars engage in a battle
of ideas which will indicate an alternative to the premises and
promises of liberalism or they will remain prisoners of the
constitutive liberal dichotomy the rational/irrational—the one
deployed in the neoconservative tales of Kulturkampf—which
distinguishes between an intrinsically violent “state of nature” and an
abstract composite, the body politic.
II. POST-MOMS
Why and how the neo-conservative rewriting of the
public/private dichotomy has been so successful is a question at the
core of Martha T. McCluskey’s “The Politics of Class in the ‘Nanny Wars’:
Where is Neoliberalism in the Kulturkampf?” In this piece, Professor
McCluskey shows how it results from an artful deployment of
public/private dichotomy in an ethico-political account which
reconfigures another dear liberal pair, namely culture/economics, in
which liberalism’s highest value, freedom, is constructed as a
monopoly of the (righteous) individual. Anyone familiar with the
trajectory of modern philosophy would not cringe at this unexpected
marriage of economy and morality in which the family becomes the
site of a moral battle where the contending parts are differentiated
according to how they view and behave towards marriage and
childbearing/rearing. For one thing, Locke’s proper political
subjects—individuals able to conceive and ‘sign-on’ to the social
contract—are European (white) males, property-owners, and heads
of households. The liberal social (juridico/economic) subject has
always sided with the family—if for anything because the family was
also his property, though he was not willing to trade it in the market.
What Professor McCluskey’s piece highlights however is not
this recent re-enactment of the liberal play. She is concerned with
the fact that progressive intellectuals enter the moral battle from a
defensive position.
Instead of challenging this founding
public/private dichotomy, they choose the public, namely the
economic, and accept the neoliberals and neoconservatives’
resolution of the signifiers of the Global Matrix—race, gender, class,
sexuality, and religion. That is, against progressive agendas that
dismiss this separation by establishing that private has always been
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public—the victory of 1960s Civil Rights, nationalist, feminist, and
youth movements—neo-conservatives embrace their claim but rewrite
it within the liberal logic which conceives of the private as individual,
as a matter of (subjective) values and preferences. When doing so,
they turn the 1980s (cultural, identity) politics of representation on
its head by advancing a politics of individual self-representation.
With this, neo-conservatives reinstitute the classical social
(legal/political) subject in a moral tale that rewrites the Global
Matrix when they attribute a ‘failure’ to actualize proper moral
(family) values to (racial, gendered-sexual) subalterns’ cultural
difference.
For this reason, her analysis of Flanagan’s piece
published in The Atlantic Monthly provides not so much an indictment
of the feminist project itself, which has consistently (at least the
second wave) focused upon patriarchy, but a version which seeks to
keep the feminist (economic) bathwater and the baby too! The
inability to recognize the political/economic determinants of their
“freedom” results not from the fact that feminism does not
acknowledge class and race as producers/signifiers of female social
(juridico and economic) trajectories. As we well know, there have
been many versions of the feminist project—in the U.S. women of
color and third world feminists did not take long to call the attention
to their middle-class, white, feminist comrades of their own
universalizing tendencies. What Professor McCluskey notes is how
the neoconservative rewriting of the “original” liberal figure, the
individual, finds its way into feminist discourse. That is, she indicates
how feminist discourse resurrects the social subject postmodern
critical (feminist, racial, queer, etc.) interventions proclaimed no
longer existent when it privileges the Global Matrix as grounds for
ethico-epistemological-political engagement. Whether the nanny is
an undocumented immigrant from Venezuela, a refugee from
Guatemala, or Puerto Rican, in the Global Matrix she belongs in a
slot that always precludes her from occupying the position of the
“individual.” Hence, no matter how conscious the females she
liberates become of the political/economic inequities neo-liberalism
re-produces, as long as her employers do so from their position as
U.S. white (or otherwise), middle-class females always already
individuals, she will always inhabit the mark assigned to social (racial,
gendered/sexual, economic) subalterns. The nagging question, of
course, is whether and how progressive legal scholarship can advance
a mapping of the public sphere which comprehends the global
(racial/cultural) subalterns, the ones whose subjection has for the
last hundred years or so delimited the position of the proper social
subject, the one the notion of juridical universality both presupposes
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and institutes. When asking this question I am not intimating that
progressive legal scholarship is doomed because it shares in the
predicament haunting any ethico-political project circumscribed
(enabled/precluded) by the liberal social ontology. As the Brazilian
saying goes, the hole is farther down.
Following the path already determined by the context they
choose to intervene, each engage the dichotomy itself as the matter
at stake, and all hold on to the “/” for without it critique itself would
have no sense. For moving towards (re)formulations of the above
questions, the papers in this cluster choose to inhabit the “/.” As
each displaces this dichotomy, they respond to the challenges the
cultural presents to the legal, which is represented as the latest
rehearsal as a public versus private war. The public before the
private? What is the crit legal scholar to do before this choice? What
are the options? Both? And? Either/Or? As each displaces the term
Kulturkampf to uncover at the core of the liberal project productive
fissures that, instead of rendering it irrelevant, make the critic’s task
all the more crucial when the hegemonic ethico-political grammar
discourse seeks to erase the dichotomy, not by collapsing the terms or
by eliminating difference as the assimilationist strategy predicated,
but by highlighting difference and describing the positions each
social scientific signifier institutes. Such strategy, as the rhetoric and
practices the “faithful freedom-lovers” now deploy against the rest of
the planet indicate, renders quite easy the (moral) justification of
projects which seek not only to (legally/politically) exclude but to
incarcerate or eliminate those global subalterns, the cultural warriors,
the neoconservative tale places on the non-valued side of the “/.”

